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Policing the Police Power: Analyzing 
Safety-Minded Restrictions on Drink 
Specials as Valid Exercise of 
Municipal Authority 
Raymond T. Rhatican 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the basis and contours of municipal police power through a 
critical review of recent restrictions proposed in Columbia, Missouri and elsewhere 
on drink specials. These restrictions are an attempt at benefit-shifting, which would 
impose an economic burden on restaurant and bar proprietors in exchange for an 
expected public benefit in reduced late-night nuisances and safety hazards. The ar-
ticle argues that municipal authority pursuant to the police power should be subject 
to a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny to ensure reasonable and well-consid-
ered regulation. Finally, this article suggests a more effective and less burdensome 
way to address the community’s concerns regarding liquor sales without punishing 
a small group of individuals. 
  
 
 Raymond Rhatican is a second-year law student and associate member of the Business, Entrepreneur-
ship, & Tax Law Review. 
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Early in 2019 the Columbia City Council received a report and recommenda-
tions from staff members and interested parties which detailed public safety con-
cerns in the Missouri city regarding widespread intoxication, especially during late 
night hours.1 Under consideration by the council was an ordinance similar to those 
adopted by other college towns including Iowa City, Baton Rouge, and Athens.2 
This ordinance sought to address underage and excessive alcohol consumption by 
placing restrictions on bar and restaurant specials, including a ban of “bottomless 
cups.”3 In support of the proposed ordinance, the City Council provided a list of 
state-imposed happy hour restrictions in force across the country.4 
Past attempts to curb sales of cheap drinks have failed.5 Specifically, Missouri 
statutes and regulations prohibiting alcohol producers, distributors, and retailers 
from advertising specials on alcoholic beverages outside their establishments have 
been struck down on First Amendment grounds.6 Although states have unique 
power to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment, this authority is lim-
ited by the requirement that such regulation does not otherwise “violate rights se-
cured by the Constitution of the United States.”7 States are unable to use Twenty-
First Amendment authority to infringe upon other Constitutional protections.8 
This article explores municipal authority to regulate economic activity such 
drink specials. Section I addresses differing forms of state grants of authority to 
cities and townships. Section II explores the police power as it is understood among 
courts, a broad and mercurial power through which this kind of state and munici-
pality regulation is enacted. A critical eye is cast upon the requirement that the 
means adopted by a state or municipality in effecting the police power be merely 
reasonable and not arbitrary in pursuit of a valid government objective. The inquiry 
specifically reviews application of the police power to drink specials and whether 
an ordinance adopted to this end can and should pass muster as valid. This article 
concludes by analyzing other available means to address safety concerns regarding 
alcohol consumption that constitute a lesser burden on alcohol retailers and distrib-
utors in the affected communities and promises a more concrete and beneficial so-
lution. 
 
 1. Runjie Wang, The push to restrict drink specials is gaining momentum in Columbia, COLUMBIA 
MISSOURIAN (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/local/the-push-to-restrict-
drink-specials-is-gaining-momentum-in/article_ff0c8828-437e-11e9-a01d-2b4ce5954d21.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Philip Joens, City looks at ban on drink specials, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (Jul. 28, 2019) 
https://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20190728/city-looks-at-ban-on-drink-specials. 
 4. State Happy Hour Restrictions – Exhibit A, COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL 
https://www.como.gov/health/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2019/06/State-Happy-Hour-Restrictions-
Exhibit-A-1-1.pdf (last visited November 30, 2020). 
 5. Federal Judge Rules Missouri Alcohol Advertising Restrictions Unconstitutional, MO. 
BROADCASTERS ASSOC. (Nov. 25, 2019, 11:57 AM), https://www.mbaweb.org/federal-judge-rules-mis-
souri-alcohol-advertising-restrictions-unconstitutional/. 
 6. See Missouri Broadcasters Ass’n v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 460-62 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 7. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659 (1887). 
 8. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). 
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II. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY 
Whereas previous attempts at advertising restrictions have been enacted at a 
statewide level,9 the proposed ordinance limiting drink specials would be imposed 
by the Columbia City Council.10 Missouri charter cities, such as Columbia,11 are 
able to regulate local activity if the ordinance does not violate applicable constitu-
tional or statutory law.12 Unlike the federal government, which enjoys supremacy 
within their constitutional realms of authority,13 states retain the historic police 
power over objects within state purview.14 Namely, this police power allows states 
to regulate for the “protection of the public health, safety, morals or welfare.”15 
State legislatures are able to confer that power to cities and townships.16 As initially 
envisioned, federalism would operate in such a manner that federal jurisdiction 
would “exten[d] to certain enumerated objects only, and leav[e] to the several States 
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”17 Of course, such a 
restrained power-sharing dynamic has not existed in practice.18 Still, states retain 
autonomy in certain fields, including public education and enforcement of state 
criminal law.19 
The power local governments may exercise is exclusively that which is dele-
gated by states.20 The scope of authority depends on the state and the characteristics 
of the municipality.21  A municipality’s power is determined according to whether 
the municipality’s grant of authority is characterized under “home rule” or “Dillon’s 
rule.”22 Dillon’s rule holds that local governments have only the powers specifically 
enumerated by state statute or constitution, greatly restricting the power and discre-
tion of these localities.23 Most states,24 including Missouri,25 have bestowed “home 
rule” authority upon certain municipalities, which allows exercise of power even 
absent a specific grant from the state constitution or legislature.26 In fact, Missouri 
 
 9. See Missouri Broadcasters Ass’n, 946 F.3d at 457. 
 10. Council Memo, COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL (FEB. 4, 2019), https://www.como.gov/health/wp-con-
tent/uploads/sites/13/2019/06/Council-Memo-3-1-1.pdf. 
 11. Daniel Cailler, Charter is ‘power to the people’, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (Mar. 14, 2010 
12:01AM), https://www.columbiatribune.com/cce2fbad-1559-5c6b-a223-b02de3d05c5c.html. 
 12. State ex inf. Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Mo. 1984). 
 13. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (“[T]he States are precluded from regu-
lating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regu-
lated by its exclusive governance.”). 
 14. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 15. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 524 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Mo. 1975). 
 16. Miller v. City of Town & Country, 62 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). 
 18. Stephen R. McAllister, IS THERE A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE LIMIT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV 217, 221-22 
(1996). 
 19. Robert G. Natelson, More News on Powers Reserved Exclusively to the States, 20 FEDERALIST 
SOC’ REV. 92, 98 (2019). 
 20. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1984, 
1984-85 (2006). 
 21. See Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. STEWART E. STERK, ET. AL, LAND USE REGULATION 23 (2d ed. 2016). 
 24. Bluestein, supra note 20, at 1989. 
 25. The Missouri Roster¸ MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE 158 (2019), 
https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/Publications/2019-2020_MO_Roster.pdf. 
 26. STERK, supra note 23. 
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became the first state to recognize “home rule” authority in its constitution in 
1875.27 In Missouri, this authority is provided only to charter cities, and allows them 
to exercise “all powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has 
authority to confer upon any city.”28 In other words, municipalities may exercise 
any power the state legislature is capable of delegating, even if they have not done 
so, absent an express disallowance. This framework is typical of home rule power 
across the nation, and shields home rule municipalities from legislative meddling 
with respect to “matters of local concern.”29 
Unlike the majority of cities and townships in Missouri, Columbia enjoys char-
ter city status with home rule authority.30 The question of whether Columbia has 
the ability to forbid certain drink specials is thus largely dependent upon whether 
the general assembly has the authority to do so.31 The state legislature cannot dele-
gate a power it does not have. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a substantive 
dimension demanding all legislation serve a “legitimate governmental purpose,” but 
the Supreme Court takes a lenient approach to this end.32 The Court in modern times 
has followed the principle that  states may “legislate against what are found to be 
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs,” provided the 
legislation does not violate federal constitutional prohibition or statute.33 
State courts have often been more demanding.34 For example, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has offered less latitude to the police power,35holding: 
a law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must not be unrea-
sonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the 
means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects 
sought to be attained. Under the guise of protecting the public interests the legisla-
ture may not arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and un-
necessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.36 
Under this framework, whether a provision is sufficiently related to the public 
good and reasonable in its means is left to the final judgment of the judiciary.37 
III. THE POLICE POWER 
Under the power-sharing arrangement in the federal system discussed above, 
states enjoy authority to exercise the general police power, empowering them to 
regulate for the furtherance of the public health, welfare, and morals.38 Missouri 
courts have long defined the police power as “the power inherent in a government 
 
 27. Cailler, supra note 11. 
 28. MO. CONST. art. VI § 19(a). 
 29. Bluestein, supra note 20, at 1990. 
 30. The Missouri Roster, supra note 25, at 162. 
 31. MO. CONST. art. VI § 19(a). 
 32. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET. AL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 40 (6th 
ed. 2006). 
 33. Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. 335 U.S. 525, 536 
(1949); see also MANDELKER, supra note 32. 
 34. MANDELKER, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Gambone v. Com., 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
 38. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972). 
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to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, mor-
als and general welfare of society.”39 General welfare is treated as “comprehen-
sive.”40 Subject to the restrictions stated above, the Supreme Court has construed 
the Twenty-First Amendment to confer an enlarged police power with respect to 
the sale of intoxicating liquors and the “bacchanalian revelries”41 the trade may en-
tail.42 
Despite the broad judicial deference enjoyed by the state and municipal police 
power, it is still subject to the condition that it be exercised reasonably.43 Any exer-
cise of police power “must necessarily involve a study of the reasonableness and 
appropriateness of the means employed to accomplish the public object.”44 How-
ever, courts take varying approaches to this reasonableness analysis. For example, 
a California appellate court has determined maintaining a “dignified and respectful 
environment” sufficiently implicates the general welfare to support regulatory ac-
tion.45 The court was careful to note that these facts did not indicate “personal an-
tipathy” toward the regulated industry.46 
To pass the reasonableness test, a court must be satisfied that the activity facing 
proposed regulation “presents a reasonable necessity for the imposition of restraint” 
in furtherance of permissible police power objectives and that the restrictions “bear 
a reasonable relation” to the objective.47 Laws interfering with use and enjoyment 
of property must be supported by some sort of public necessity.48 Still, even a min-
imal connection will suffice: to find an ordinance unconstitutional, it must be clearly 
arbitrary or unreasonable,49 having no relation to public health, morals, safety, or 
general welfare.50 
IV. APPLYING THE POLICE POWER 
A. Due Process Concerns 
A potential challenge to the drinking special regulation proposed to the Colum-
bia City Council could arise under constitutional due process. The Supreme Court 
of Missouri has upheld restrictions on alcohol sales against such challenges, char-
acterizing prohibitions on inducements including dancing, games, and “free 
lunches” incident to selling beer and liquor as “fairly referable to the police 
power.”51 Years prior to that decision, the Missouri high court had already held: 
 
 39. State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis 2 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Mo. 1928). 
 40. Id. 
 41. California, 409 U.S. 109 at 118. 
 42. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972). 
 43. SP Star Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 173 Cal. App. 4th 459, 473 (2009). 
 44. Samuel M. Soref, The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 6 
(1930). 
 45. SP Star Enterprises, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th at 475-76 (denying issuance of a conditional use permit 
to serve alcohol). 
 46. See Id. at 473. 
 47. State ex rel., Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 453 (Wis. 1923). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 
1974). 
 50. Ex parte Williams, 139 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. 1940). 
 51. Zinn v. City of Steelville, 173 S.W.2d 398, 400-402 (Mo. 1943). 
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[A] statute or a municipal ordinance, which is fairly referable to the police 
power of the state or municipality, and which discloses upon its face, or which may 
be shown aliunde, to have been enacted for the protection, and in furtherance, of the 
peace, comfort, safety, health, morality, and general welfare of the inhabitants of 
the state or municipality, does not contravene or infringe the several sections of the 
state and federal Constitutions invoked by the appellants herein, and cannot be held 
invalid as wrongfully depriving the appellants of any right or privilege guaranteed 
by the Constitution, state or federal; the reason and basis underlying such decisions 
being that the personal and property rights of the individual are subservient and 
subordinate to the general welfare of society, and of the community at large, and 
that a statute or ordinance which is fairly referable to the police power has for its 
object the “greatest good of the greatest number.”52 
Accordingly, to satisfy due process, the question upon which a challenged or-
dinance’s viability turns is whether the ordinance is “fairly referable to the police 
power of the respondent municipality” and whether it bears a “substantial and ra-
tional relation to the health, safety, peace, comfort, and general welfare” of the com-
munity.53 If this question is answered affirmatively, the ordinance will not be found 
to infringe upon due process “unless it well can be said that the ordinance ‘passes 
the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.’”54 
The bar to a successful due process challenge is raised by a presumption of 
reasonableness.55 The challenger carries the burden of demonstrating unreasonable-
ness, unless the ordinance is found facially unreasonable.56 Mere deprivation of 
some use and enjoyment of a challenger’s property is not enough.57 Instead, local 
governments are empowered to subjugate personal autonomy in the interest of the 
general welfare:58 
It is thoroughly established in this country that the rights preserved to the indi-
vidual by these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the rights of 
society. Although one owns property, he may not do with it as he pleases, any more 
than he may act in accordance with his personal desires. 59 
B. Police Power and The Takings Clause 
Another possible challenge to a regulation restricting an individual’s ability to 
sell a product at a price of her choosing could arise under the Takings Clause. The 
Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that “No person shall […] be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”60 While local governments are 
given a wide berth when exercising the police power, this does not exempt them 
 
 52. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 628, 634 (Mo.1929) (collecting cases). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204 (1912)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 628, 634 (Mo. 1929). 
 58. See State ex rel., Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 453 (Wis. 1923). 
 59. Id. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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from paying just compensation when this constitutional requirement is triggered.61 
When “justness and fairness require,” a landowner must be compensated for eco-
nomic injuries caused by government actions, rather than forcing a small group of 
citizens to support the welfare of the community at large.62 However, interference 
with private property is not always a taking.63 
A taking is rather easily identified when the challenged government action con-
sists of a “straightforward, physical appropriation of land for a public use . . . .”64 
The task can be more difficult when an alleged taking stems from a benefit-shifting 
regulation.65 A categorical taking is generally a permanent physical invasion of pri-
vate property, no matter how small, by the government.66 A categorical taking is 
not confined to actual physical appropriation but also extends to total deprivation 
of a property’s use, regardless of whether title has been taken.67 Regulations may 
exact such a burden upon a landowner as to constitute a taking, under the maxim 
that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking.”68 In addition to categorical taking analysis, a reg-
ulatory taking may also be found under an ad hoc analysis utilizing Penn Central 
balancing, which looks to a number of factors to determine whether a compensable 
taking has occurred, including: the economic impact of  the regulation, the character 
of the government action, and (most importantly) whether the action has interfered 
with a landowner’s distinct investment-backed expectations.69 
As applied to drink specials, whether a takings challenge may succeed against 
the proposed ban may depend upon the outcome of the police power reasonableness 
inquiry itself. Government action resulting in economic harm, without more, does 
not constitute a taking.70 Rather, the  action must interfere with “interests that [are] 
sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 
‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”71 If a regulation enacted to curb public 
nuisance and safety hazards is found to be a reasonable exercise of the police power, 
it is unlikely the regulation could be found to interfere with a burdened proprietor’s 
distinct investment-backed expectations. Landowners and business owners, of 
course, have notice that their property rights and activities are subject to reasonable 
restraints pursuant to the police power.72 
 
 61. Clay Cty. ex rel. Cty. Comm’n of Clay Cty. v. Harley & Susie Bogue, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 102, 106 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“A regulatory taking occurs when a regulation enacted under the police power of 
the government goes too far.”). 
 62. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 63. See Home Sav. of Am., F.A. v. State, 817 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 64. F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, 
and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 466 (2001). 
 65. See Id. 
 66. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
 67. See Mugler v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 667-69 (1887). 
 68. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 69. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 124-25. 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Mo. 1962). 
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C. Applicability of the Police Power to Drink Specials 
Muted constitutional restraints have allowed municipalities to successfully in-
voke police power authority in a number of situations.73 For example, state courts 
have found community aesthetics to be a valid police power objective.74 The Su-
preme Court has held: 
[T]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the 
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well 
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.75 
It is not in dispute that liquor sales are within the scope of the police power.76 
When exercised properly, a state (and by delegation, municipalities) may enact 
measures to protect the public, judging for itself “the necessity or expediency of the 
means adopted.”77 One U.S. District Court has held, “[a]s a matter of common 
sense, specials such as ‘all you can drink’ and ‘beat the clock,’ and the selling of 
cheap drinks all promote excessive drinking.” 78 Such a characterization of drink 
specials brings them squarely within the scope of the police power if it can be rea-
sonably assumed that excessive drinking leads to problems implicating public 
health, safety, and the general welfare. 
Therefore, the critical question regarding the validity of Columbia’s proposed 
ordinance is whether the means adopted to carry out the permissible objective of 
curtailing excessive drinking are appropriately tailored to that end.79 The appropri-
ateness of the means of enforcement is critical to a valid exercise of the police 
power,80 as those means must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.81 
V. POLICING THE POLICE POWER 
Based on the forgoing, it is likely the Columbia City Council will be granted 
wide latitude in regulating excessive drinking. To ensure that business owners who 
stand to bear the weight of these proposed regulations are properly protected, it may 
be necessary to police the police power itself rather than advance an argument that 
the police power does not apply or does not provide the requisite authority. This can 
be difficult, in no small part because this power eludes a satisfactory definition.82 
As a Missouri appellate court has described this problem: 
 
 73. See generally Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 258-59 (N.Y. 1977). 
 74. Id. at 260-261 (“aesthetics, in itself, constitutes a valid basis for the exercise of the police power 
just as safety does.”); see also City of Independence v. Richards 666 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 75. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 76. Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201 (1912) (collecting cases) (“That the state, 
in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit the selling of intoxicating liquors, is undoubted.”). 
 77. Id. at 203-04. 
 78. Habash v. City of Salisbury, 618 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (D. Md. 2009) 
 79. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954) (“an exercise of the police power must 
not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means 
which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.”). 
 80. Soref, supra note 44. 
 81. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Mo. 1962). 
 82. See Damon v. City of Kansas City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“Such power is 
incapable of exact definition, but the existence of it is essential to every well ordered government.”). 
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This [difficulty in defining the police power] is so for the reason that the po-
lice power of a state is that power which is necessary for its preservation and with-
out which it cannot serve the purpose for which it was formed. As has been well 
said, the police power of a state may be shortly defined to be the power of the leg-
islature to make such regulations relating to personal and property rights as apper-
tain to the public health, the public safety, and the public morals. These principles 
are so well known that it is unnecessary to cite the authorities.83 
This expansive definition offers little clarity and much opportunity for legisla-
tion by fiat, because “[w]hen it comes to the power of states over their people, the 
issue has always been shrouded in doubt.”84 The resultant views on state power 
differ between a conceptualization of fearsome state power fettered only by express 
prohibition by the U.S. Constitution and one that demands limits to prevent state 
despotism.85 
In terms of prohibition by the Federal Constitution, statutes enacted pursuant 
to the police power have been struck down for infringing upon the Constitutional 
principle of “liberty,” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even without a find-
ing that the right in question was fundamental.86 In this line of cases, the Court 
inquired into whether individuals were “free as adults to engage in private conduct 
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause.”87 
The Court in Lawrence struck down laws forbidding sodomy between same-
sex couples pursuant to a vague substantive due process protection of  liberty and 
privacy including, “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”88 Although this principle 
is usually invoked in cases concerning more serious matters, such as the facts in 
Lawrence, the principle could be expanded to all kinds of private, adult activity. 
Unlike the Court-recognized rights to privacy and freedom from “unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion” in the familial sphere,89 the right of an individual to buy or sell 
liquor at a bargain price does not enjoy such protection. If the “right to privacy” 
enjoys constitutional protection on account of the notion that “specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance,”90 surely other decisions one makes in or-
dering their affairs could enjoy this protection. 
Part of this distinction is owed to the comparatively dismissive treatment of 
economic liberties by the Court.91 This modern trend against enforcing commercial 
rights is largely owed to criticism of “Lochnerism,” era philosophy in which the 
Court more readily substituted its judgment for that of Congress.92 In Lochner, the 
court struck down an ordinance upon a finding that it lacked a sufficient justification 
 
 83. Id. (quoting City of Kansas City v. Jordan, 174 S.W.3d 25, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 84. Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 429 
(2004). 
 85. See Id. at 429-30 
 86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 90. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 91. See Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1990) (“By 1937, economic due process was dead.”). 
 92. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 527 (2015) 
(“For a very long time, it has been an article of faith among liberals and conservatives alike that Lochner 
v. New York was obviously and irredeemably wrong.”). 
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to impede “freedom of contract.” Similar to the justification for modern privacy 
jurisprudence, freedom of contract was held (for a time) to be supported by the 
constitutional guarantee of “liberty.”93 Since Lochner (and the Great Depression), 
the Court has distanced itself from strict scrutiny of legislative judgments concern-
ing economic regulation that does not implicate privacy or personal interests.94 
The Court departed from Lochner in Nebbia v. New York, upholding New 
York’s controls on milk prices despite a questionable tailoring of means employed 
to the end sought,95 on the basis that the general right of an individual to use his 
property is subject to the restriction that the property cannot be used to the detriment 
of the public.96 Diminishing the reach of substantive due process, the Nebbia Court 
held that this protection “demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, ar-
bitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be attained.”97 Rather than allowing for meaningful 
restriction on state policymaking, the Court clarified that “[I]n the absence of other 
constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may 
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare . . . .”98 In short, due process (re-
garding non-fundamental rights) is satisfied if the law bears a “reasonable relation 
to a proper legislative purpose” and is not arbitrary or discriminatory and not spe-
cifically prohibited by the Constitution.99 Courts are without authority to inquire 
into the wisdom or efficacy of the action.100 Elsewhere, the Court distanced itself 
from Lochner in holding that the freedom of contract, rather than an absolute aspect 
of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,101 is a right subject to commu-
nity protection from “evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of 
the people.”102 
Despite enshrining the extra-textual right to “privacy,” the West Coast Hotel 
Court dismissed an absolute freedom of contract, asking, “[w]hat is this freedom? 
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”103 Liberty, in the Court’s 
summation, is subject to due process restrictions including the welfare of the com-
munity, especially, it seems, when the individual freedom the public good is 
weighed against the freedom of contract.104 As a result, “economic legislation” is 
subject to rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny.105 
 
 93. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty 
of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”). 
 94. See generally Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934). 
 95. See generally Id. at 557-58. 
 96. Id. at 523. (“[N]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist 
if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of 
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate 
it in the common interest.”). 
 97. Id. at 525. 
 98. Id. at 525. 
 99. Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.”). 
 102. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Id. at 391-92. 
 105. Fust v. Attorney Gen. for the State of Mo., 947 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Mo. 1997). 
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In Carolene Products, the Court solidified its protection of rights “individual” 
in nature rather than economic.106 In a final departure from Lochner that ushered in 
what can be fairly referred to as the Carolene Products era,107 the Court held “[T]hat 
economic regulation would be subject to rational basis tests while legislation affect-
ing discrete and insular minorities or otherwise impacting upon Bill of Rights pro-
tections, would be subject to a higher level of scrutiny.”108 This was effectively a 
reversal of the Court’s stance in the Lochner-era.109 
In the well-known fourth footnote to the Carolene Products opinion, the Court 
suggested what is understood in modern times to be a “political process” theory of 
review, applying strict scrutiny only to those legislative decisions that traditional 
political pressure has not properly policed on its own.110 However, the notion that 
rights can be policed by political processes alone has often been a catastrophic fail-
ure in practice, perhaps most poignantly in post-Carolene Products instances where 
“the Court failed to extend protection to the Japanese or to communists.”111 
Concerns that the political economy may fail to protect individual fundamental 
rights are validly based. A judicial refusal to demand legitimate economic policy-
making raises similar concerns. Heightened judicial protection of fundamental in-
dividual rights is rooted in advances in civil rights and personal privacy,112 while 
less stringent protection of economic liberty owes to a history of deference to the 
New Deal.113 Skeptical views characterize this dissonance as also rooted in bias.114 
As one observer explains, “[t]he laissez-faire assumptions behind Lochner naturally 
were an anathema to scholars and judges favoring government intervention in the 
economy and redistribution of wealth.”115 As a result, challenges to legislation en-
croaching upon property rights have been relegated to inferior status in constitu-
tional adjudication.116 The difference between protections for economic and civil 
liberties has become “one of the most enduring dichotomies in constitutional juris-
prudence.”117 
Judicial second-guessing of economic legislation need not be discarded as un-
constitutional. Rather than vilifying Lochner as a judicial usurpation of legislative 
power,118 intervention from the bench can instead be characterized as the kind of 
protection of economic liberties and property rights envisioned by the 
 
 106. See Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 
S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 169 (2004). 
 107. David Schultz, Scalia, Property, and Dolan v. Tigard: The Emergence of A Post-Carolene Prod-
ucts Jurisprudence, 29 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (1995). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Gilman, supra note 106, at 163, 173. 
 111. Id. at 180. 
 112. See Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr., 459 S.W.3d 901, 912 (Mo. 2015) (“A history of 
discrimination entitles individuals of that class to extraordinary protection.”). 
 113. See James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Due Process Revisited 44 VAND. L. REV. 213, 218 (1991) (re-
viewing PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW 
YORK (1990)). 
 114. See Ely, supra note 112, at 213. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Id. at 218. 
 117. Schultz, supra note 107, at 20. 
 118. See Id. 
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Constitution’s Framers.119 Even more readily than one can identify constitutional 
penumbras creating a zone of privacy, one can demonstrate constitutional protec-
tions of economic liberties.120 Many of these provisions were specifically tailored 
to restrict government power over economic activity, perhaps none more important 
than the Contract Clause found in Art. I.121 
Additionally, Lochner found the freedom to contract in relation with an indi-
vidual’s own business is enshrined within the concept of liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.122 Under this since-discarded reasoning, the police power 
would have to be held to a higher standard which demands genuine reasonableness, 
rather than allowing the power to grow into “mere pretext.”123 
The Lochner Court warned against what is now reality: if legislation in any 
way “was enacted to conserve the morals, the health, or the safety of the people; 
such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the 
claim might be.”124 States and municipalities have taken advantage of this authority 
that is as broad and unforgiving as it is vague.125 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To return this discussion to its initial inquiry, an informed reading of police 
power jurisprudence suggests that the ban on drink specials proposed by the Co-
lumbia City Council would stand. As discussed above, similar measures have stood 
across the country.126 This is of grave concern because regulation by city council 
fiat is capable of producing profound encroachments upon American life and liber-
ties.127 Unless legislation discriminates impermissibly against a protected class, the 
restrictive regulations will likely stand.128 
The Supreme Court had it right during the Lochner era of demanding judicial 
review.129 Although the judiciary must respect the separation of powers and  the 
superior role of the legislature in identifying and remedying ills,  courts must be 
willing and able to step in and nullify regulations which do no more than  abstractly 
promote “the public welfare” while imposing real burdens on citizens—in particular 
businesses and homeowners. Until then, courts may struggle to enforce their own 
demands that police power exercises “not be unreasonable, arbitrary, unduly 
 
 119. James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 673, 708 (2008) (“The Framers crafted the provisions in the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights to guarantee economic rights.”). 
 120. Id.at 699. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 123. Id. at 56. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See M.S., Where growing too many vegetables is illegal, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2010) 
https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2010/10/03/where-growing-too-many-vegetables-
is-illegal. 
 126. See supra Section I. 
 127. See generally Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (striking down a 
municipal ordinance which allowed cohabitation only by members of a strictly defined notion of “fam-
ily”). 
 128. See supra Section III. 
 129. See supra Section IV. 
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oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case and the means employed 
must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained.”130 
Fortunately, there is evidence that property rights may be on the path to re-
newed first class status. Even if economic rights continue to lag behind individual 
and privacy rights in judicial favor, some scholars suggest adding teeth to rational 
basis review.131 Indeed, the current standard of review with respect to economic 
rights is sometimes so weak that the Court “abandons the effort altogether and ac-
cepts any justifying rationale advanced by the state in litigation.”132 A “rational ba-
sis with bite” analysis promises to reinvigorate economic liberty in our post-De-
pression times, and is gaining popularity amid “growing public disapproval of rent-
seeking and special-interest legislation.”133 Additionally, the might of well-orga-
nized special interest groups undermines the strength of the Court’s argument in 
Carolene Products that political processes can adequately protect economic rights 
without court intervention.134 
There has been movement in the field of takings law as well. Dolan, a seminal 
takings case of the 1990s was a strong point in the Court’s review of regulatory 
takings.135 The Dolan majority struck down municipal requirements that certain 
property owners relinquish portions of their property for public goods, such as bike 
paths, in exchange for permission to make uses of other segments of their prop-
erty.136 In doing so, the Court looked for more than a simple “public good” justifi-
cation.137 More recently, the Court eliminated a significant procedural barrier to 
federal takings challenges, terminating the requirement that a landowner first ex-
haust his state remedies, holding that the petitioner’s claim was ripe the moment the 
state took his property.138 
This is a positive trend, but property rights will be truly vindicated only once 
reasonableness review becomes more demanding. A rational basis review that 
meaningfully assesses the benefit and burden of a state or municipality’s action will 
strike the proper balance between legislative prerogative and the economic liberty. 
Absent this tightened leash, municipalities are free to enact regulations which create 
significant burdens on business owners without a legitimate public benefit in return. 
A view of economic rights as less than “fundamental” has led to a “minimal scrutiny 
standard” which allows burdensome and poorly considered economic legislation to 
stand.139 Courts demand only a plausible connection to the public good, and often 
supply their own, rather than striking down a law as arbitrary.140 
 
 130. Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 755 (Mo. 1962). 
 131. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model 
for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (This standard “would have the Court 
assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in 
conjecture.”). 
 132. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 316 n.38 (1993). 
 133. Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8 NYU J.L. & 
LIBERTY 1055, 1086 (2014). 
 134. See Id. at 1086-89. 
 135. Schultz, supra note 107, at 1-2. 
 136. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380, 383, 396 (1994). 
 137. Schultz, supra note 107, at 1. 
 138. See generally Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177-78 (2019). 
 139. Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. 
L.J. 779, 783 (1987). 
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Under a more useful standard than “rational basis” review and the Carolene 
Products progeny, courts could defer to legitimate legislation while protecting eco-
nomic liberties that Americans were promised by Article I and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Short of a watershed change in constitutional law, the Columbia City Council 
should, at the very least, consider a less targeted regime than the ordinance pro-
posed. The Council has sought to restrict the ability of business owners to set their 
own prices, in the dubious hope that more costly drinks will significantly curtail the 
nuisances and hazards presented by excessive intoxication. Rather than asking this 
small group to bear the cost of a broad public benefit, the Council could instead 
invest community tax revenue into public transportation or promote education re-
inforcing safe drinking practices. The economic burden would be more fairly dis-
tributed across the parties who stand to benefit. Instead, the council has chosen to 
leave bar proprietors out to dry, hoping higher drink costs will have an effect other 
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